FIELD MANUAL No. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Section V – AirLand Battle and Counterguerrilla Operations. Donor challenge: Your generous donation will be matched 2-to-1 right now. Your $5 becomes $15! Dear Internet Archive Supporter,. I ask only. Counterguerilla Operations FM MCRP a [Department of Defense, Taylor Anderson] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. The
lperations Techniques and tactics applied successfully in one situation may not be suitable if applied in the same manner in another situation. Usually, guerrillas operating in a rear area then acquire logistical support from external sources, from captured equipment and supplies, and from the civilian populace. In this situation, the guerrilla force may be receiving some support from the populace.
The basic philosophy of rear battle doctrine is to maximize the capability of combat support and combat service support elements to defend themselves and render mutual support without requiring assistance from tactical combat forces.
Some of these factors include the force composition, aviation assets, fire support assets, mobility, equipment, and size of the counterguerrilla force. For a more recent view of related doctrine, see the U.
FM 90-8 (ARMY FIELD MANUAL), COUNTER GUERRILLA OPERATIONS (29 AUG 1986)
Terrain affects men, equipment, trafficability, visibility, and the employment of NBC weapons. Conventional forces that may conduct guerrilla warfare include forces that have been cut off or that intentionally stay behind as their main force withdraws or retreats.
The guerrilla force may possess weapons, communications, and technology equal to or superior to the rear battle forces. The counterguerrilla force commander must be aware that the guerrilla force may have NBC weapons available to it. Counterguerrilla operations in support of a conventional conflict such as the partisan operations that occurred behind German lines during World War II are discussed in Chapter 4.
U.S. Army Counterguerrilla Operations Manual
In some cases, if the guerrilla force is not too large, then it may rely on captured or improvised equipment and materiel. The counterguerrilla force, on the other hand, is usually not dependent on the economy for its operqtions.
In addition, facilities and operations that may not seem likely targets may in fact be guerrilla targets solely because of their vulnerability. The techniques used by these forces usually consist of raids and ambushes. Rather, the guerrilla force relies more on its ability to cause confusion in rear areas. For whatever the reasons — social, political, or economic — the population is generally open to change. Generally, the counterguerrilla force plans its operations to minimize damage to the economic structure of an area.
He may accomplish this by attacking key installations such as headquarters, communications sites, supply depots, maintenance facilities, and airfields. The concept of resistance applies to an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist, oppose, or overthrow the existing government. When considering the environment that the participants will be involved in, the commander’s plans for counterguerrilla operations must consider terrain and climate, as well as political, sociological, economic, and psychological factors.
Special units trained for guerrilla warfare usually have a primary mission to conduct guerrilla warfare operations against targets of opportunity with a follow-on mission to train an indigenous guerrilla force. Offensive and defensive techniques are discussed in Chapter 3. A population that actively supports the counterguerrilla force greatly enhances the capability to detect guerrilla forces.
These may include specific limitations regarding the use of firepower and types of weapons, or they may be general regarding the relationship of the counterguerrilla force with the civilian population. By destroying key facilities operatioons interdicting lines of communication and supply, the operattions force causes confusion within the friendly force rear areas.
It may not have to conduct continuous operations to achieve its goal.
FM – Field Manuals – FM Counter-guerrilla Operations | Survival Monkey Forums
Lack of government control may be real or perceived. Political considerations are reduced.
The climate is also analyzed to determine the effect it will have on guerrilla operations as regards trafficability, visibility, and equipment. The commander uses one third of the available time for planning and leaves two thirds for subordinate planning and preparation. He will effect liaison with all forces operating in his area of responsibility, fix specific responsibilities, and exercise overall control of defensive operations in response to a guerrilla threat.
Operational planning is conducted as early as possible. Enter Your Email Address. The counterguerrilla force commander may or may not have control over all forces in the rear area for employment in rear battle operations.
The principles in this manual are guides to be adapted to each counterguerrilla situation. They are characterized by elusiveness, surprise, and brief, violent action.
A cold climate usually favors the counterguerrilla force and hampers guerrilla operations since it increases the logistics required to support the guerrilla.
Generally, these techniques can be classified as either offensive or defensive. Generally, a mild climate favors the guerrilla force since it induces less physical hardship, and may provide year-round vegetation for subsistence, cover, and concealment.
When US forces operate in captured enemy territory, then the sociological factors may favor the guerrilla force. An insurgency implies a situation where a country is threatened by an internal attempt, frequently assisted by external support, to overthrow the legitimate government.
Counterguerrilla Operations FM pages August The aims, objectives, and methods of guerrilla warfare differ greatly from those of conventional warfare. The capabilities of the enemy are examined. Usually, when US forces operate in friendly territory or liberate previously captured friendly territory, the sociological factors generally favor the counterguerrilla force. Each geographic area is analyzed to determine the effects of climate since no two areas have identical climates.
In addition, the commander may have allied regular, paramilitary, and irregular forces under his control in certain situations.
The nature of the threat and tactics suitable to counter the threat are discussed. The mere knowledge that the guerrilla exists within the rear area, even though undetected, may be enough. These forces generally possess the weapons and equipment of the main enemy force. The doctrine provides principles to guide the actions of US forces conducting counterguerrilla operations.
In applying these principles, the commander must be aware that the situation in each counterguerrilla operation is unique. Observation and fields of fire, Cover and concealment, Obstacles, Key terrain to include likely guerrilla targets and base campsand Avenues of approach or escape.
An understanding of the goals of a guerrilla force operating in rear areas and a general analysis of the environment of the area of operations provide a framework for planning.